ARIF UGUR Turkish National Charged with Wire Fraud & Illegally Exporting Defense Articles to Turkey

….prohibit the export of U.S. controlled commodities, including weapons, weapons systems, military equipment and technology.

Defendant ARIF UGUR

Managing Partner at Anatolia Group Limited Partnership - LinkedIn Archive

http://www.anatoliadefense.com/cgi-sys/defaultwebpage.cgi <—trust me click on https://www.facebook.com/Anatolia-Group-Limited-Partnership

♦️Per the June 22, 2021 DOJ-OPA

Turkish National Charged with Wire Fraud and Illegally Exporting Defense Articles to Turkey

…the Defendant allegedly defrauded the U.S. Department of Defense and exported technical data controlled under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations and the United States Munitions List to Turkish manufacturer without an export license —Defendant UGUR was arrested today in the EDVA - the Affiant is a special agent with -Special Agent of the United States Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Homeland Security Investigations ..

…responsible for investigating and enforcing violations of the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2778, as well as the Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. §§ 730-774, and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701 et seq., and relevant regulation -

Defendant ARIF UGUR charged

• via Criminal Complaint https://ecf.mad.uscourts.gov/doc1/095110606499

22 U.S.C. § 2778 -Illegal Exports in Violation of the Arms Export Control Act

22 U.S.C. § 2778 & 18 U.S.C. § 371 - Conspiracy to Violate the Arms Export Control Act

18 U.S.C. § 1343 - Wire Fraud

the defendant(s) violated: Offense Description Illegal Exports in Violation of the Arms Export Control Act Conspiracy to Violate the Arms Export Control Act

• The Affidavit https://ecf.mad.uscourts.gov/doc1/095110606500

…between approximately July 2015 and November 2017, UGUR conspired to and did illegally export certain defense articles — namely technical data related to various military parts and machine components — designated under Categories II and XX of the United States Munitions List (“USML”), from the United States to Turkey, without the required licenses or written authorizations from the U.S. Department of State…

18 U.S.C. §1343 - Wire Fraud

And while most breeze through affidavits - I’m not like most…because this paragraph is not only alarming but it’s kind of stunning —while pretty brazen of the Defendant…

Relevant Legal Authority and Legal Framework

• Arms Export Control Act (AECA) 22 U.S.C. § 2751 et seq - authorized the President of the United States to control the export of “defense articles” and “defense services.” 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1).

• The statutory authority of the President to promulgate regulations under AECA was delegated to State Department by Executive Order 11958

• ITAR, 22 C.F.R. Parts 120-130 - are administered and enforced by the Department of State’s Directorate of Trade Controls (“DDTC”) - you should bookmark the DDTC webpage.

Technical Data is defined under 22 C.F.R. §120.10

Technical Data is defined pursuant to 22 C.F.R. §120.10 —which reads in part:

“Technical Data” is defined as, among other things, [i]nformation, other than software … which is required for the design, development, production, manufacture, assembly, operation, repair, testing, maintenance or modification of defense articles,” including information in the form of “blueprints, drawings, photographs, plans, instructions or documentation.”

22 C.F.R. § 121.1 - The United States Munitions List. - now is the time to pay attention to what’s in the Affidavit - specifically paragraphs 8 thru 11 which gives you a very clear picture of what Defendant (and his four other co-conspirators) sent/shared with Turkey. Specifically paragraph 9 - which states clearly:

The USML is published at 22 C.F.R. § 121.1. At all relevant times, Category II of the USML included various “Guns and Armament” and related technical data. Category XX of the USML included “Submersible Vessels and Related Articles” and related technical data.

Anatolia Group LP and Defendant UGUR

Dozens of Department of Defense Contracts awarded to Defendant UGUR’s company: Anatolia Group Limited Partnership - I supposed you’d like to review the 52+ contract awards during 2015 to present? I ran a report around 11:32PM and uploaded the PDF to my public drive —to give you an idea of how much the DOD awarded Defendant UGUR’s Company:

• FY 2015 $413,885.24

• FY 2016 $246,413.36

  • FY 2017 ($158,185.12)

  • FY 2018 ($35,394.20)

  • FY 2019 ($100.00)

• FY 2020 & 2021 $0.00

July 2015 and September 2017, UGUR acquired dozens of contracts to supply DOD entities with various parts and hardware items used by the U.S. military. Many of these contracts required that the parts be “domestic end product,” manufactured in the United States.

Affidavit of Probable Cause

Things you never want to see in an affidavit (besides your name) “no _____ capabilities whatsoever”

Anatolia had no manufacturing capabilities whatsoever and many of the parts that Anatolia supplied to DOD and its affiliates were manufactured overseas, including by at least one manufacturer in Turkey… Some of these parts were substandard…could not be used for their intended military purpose.

In order to enable the Turkish Manufacturer to make some of the parts, UGUR provided the foreign manufacturer with technical specifications and drawings of the parts, which UGUR obtained from the Defense Logistics Agency… Several of these drawings and specifications were designated as defense articles, meaning a license was required to export the drawings and specifications to Turkey, or even to share them with non-U.S. persons or foreign persons located in the United States.

Defendant “UGUR Fraudulently Obtains DOD Contracts and Conspires to Violate, and Does Violate, the AECA” - I sure hope the nearly $660K combined for FY 2015 & 2016- were worth compromising our National Security and putting the men and women of our military in danger was “some how worth” the years long fraud and deceit…

U.S/Canada Joint Certification Program (JPC)

When a “new” Department of Defense (DOD) vendor/contract is officially added to a (and there are many) Contract Databases - for example: DLA-DIBBS https://www.dibbs.bsm.dla.mil/ -DCMA https://www.dcma.mil/ -GWAC https://www.contractdirectory.gov/contractdirectory/ …but I am old school DC PITA —I detest SAM.gov next generation platform. It’s like your four times great-grandfather and your child decided to create a program that would be clunky AF, while the secret menu items are garbled in like finding a random Easter egg and all you want is the actual contract vehicle. Like I said I’m old school: https://www.fpds.gov <— is my favorite database

The US/Canada Joint Certification Program —requires contractors to certify -in writing, “ the custodian of the technical data is a US or Canadian citizen” also the JPC requires the applicant to “swear in writing” that they understand the laws governing U.S. export control and the applicant agrees not to disseminate said technical data in a manner that would violate such laws (see DD Form 2345)

Individuals A, B, C…

On or about August 13, 2015 - Defendant UGUR applied for JPC certification. On the exact day the Defendant sent a email to three Turkish Nationals (Individual A, B, C…) —providing detailed instructions on how to access to eFolders — the email also included a document called a “Military Critical Technical Data Agreement” signed by UGUR and JCP representativehis to co-conspirators long onto

The footnote on page 9 - read it closely - some of the evidence in this case derive from a Secondary TSA (CBP) screening after flying from Germane to Chicago Illinois…

…searched the devices for 60 days, at which time the border search was terminated, and the devices were officially seized by HSI pending the issuance of Rule 41 search warrants… Rule 41 warrants were obtained in December 2018,

What is noteworthy about that footnote is the date —because there were multiple cases concerning the search and seizure of airline passengers and litigated in numerous Federal District Court and in February of 2021 the First Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the previous district court ruling

Individual D and IP addresses…

Defendant UGUR sent three different emails in May, June and November of 2017 —telling Individuals A, B, and C that he had changed the password for his DIBBS account.

July 20, 2017, for example, an employee of the Turkish Manufacture (identified herein as “Individual D”) emailed UGUR telling him that “cFolders … requested for us to change the password.” …Individual D went on to provide UGUR with the updated cFolders password.

“…I have probable cause to believe that ARIF UGUR (1) conspired with Individuals A, B, C and D, among others, to export defense technical data controlled under the USML from the United States to Turkey without first obtaining required export licenses from the U.S. Department of State..

…exported technical data controlled under the USML from the United States to Turkey without first obtaining required export licenses… committed wire fraud, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1343 by devising a scheme to fraudulently obtain contracts from DOD…

Based on the statutes Defendant UGUR could face:

• The charge of violating the Arms Export Control Act has a maximum penalty of up to 20 years in prison, three years of supervised release and a fine of up to $1 million, or twice the gross gain or loss of the offense.

• The charge of conspiring to violate the Arms Export Control Act provides for a sentence of up to five years in prison, three years of supervised release and a fine of $250,000.

• The charge of wire fraud provides for a maximum sentence of up to 20 years in prison, three years of supervised release and a fine of up to $250,000 or twice the gross gain or loss of the offense. Sentences are imposed by a federal district court judge based upon the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

Again here’s the DOJ-OPA link -spoiler the press release does not contain a link to the criminal complaint or affidavit

Criminal Complaint https://ecf.mad.uscourts.gov/doc1/095110606499

The Affidavit https://ecf.mad.uscourts.gov/doc1/095110606500 or via my public drive

And with that you should be fully up to speed - Filey