Newly released GAO F-35 Report

F-35 JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER - the DOD Needs to Update Modernization Schedule and Improve Data on Software Development - this money pit just got infinitely deeper

Earlier this month, I published the following article surrounding the known and unknown issues plaguing the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. I would recommend you take a brief moment to reread that article - before we jump into the NEWLY released GAO Report ¹

F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: DOD Needs to Update Modernization Schedule and Improve Data on Software Development

GAO-21-226 Published: Mar 18, 2021 - Glossary of Acronyms used in the GAO Report:

• Autonomic Logistics Information System -ALIS

• Continuous Capability Development and Delivery -C2D2

• Coronavirus Disease 2019 - COVID-19

• Department of Defense - DOD

• Director of Operational Test and Evaluation - DOT&E

• National Defense Authorization Act - NDAA

• Operational Data Integrated Network - ODIN

• Technology Refresh 2 - TR-2

• Technology Refresh 3 - TR-3

So let’s do away with the normal wordy pleasantries and just get right into the Report (https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-226.pdf) —We’ve also previously discussed the objectives of this program - but ICYMI;

The program is producing and delivering three variants of the F-35 aircraft:

• F-35A conventional takeoff and landing variant for the Air Force,

• F-35B short takeoff and vertical landing variant for the Marine Corps, and

• F-35C carrier-suitable variant for the Marine Corps and the Navy.

Purpose of the GAO’s second follow up Report:

“…(1) identify and describe any remaining risks with completing operational testing for the baseline program ahead of the next production milestone decision, and the steps DOD took to mitigate them; (2) assess DOD’s progress in developing and delivering Block 4 modernization capabilities and the program’s efforts to address any remaining risks; and (3) determine the extent to which the F-35 program office is addressing key selected Agile software development practices as it implements Block 4 development…” ²

The GAO found - while not surprising it does need to be repeated- the delays have a snow-balling effect - where it is now at a tipping point of a full on avalanche. And that’s not exactly ideal both in terms of our collective national Security and that of our NATO allies…

• delayed the completion of key testing until problems with the F-35 aircraft simulator are resolved, which GAO also reported last year, and will again delay its full-rate production decision.

• August 2020, the program office determined the aircraft simulator—to be used to replicate complex test scenarios that could not be accomplished in real-world environment testing—did not fully represent F-35 capabilities and could not be used for further testing until fixed.

• The DOD routinely underestimated the amount of work needed to develop "Block 4" capabilities, resulting in additional schedule delays.

• DOD is now in its third year of its modernization effort, known as Block 4, to upgrade the hardware and software of the aircraft. While DOD added another year to the schedule, GAO found the remaining development time frame is not achievable.

• the F-35 program office has not implemented tools to enable automated data collection on software development performance, a key practice. The program’s primary reliance on the contractor’s monthly reports, often based on older data, has hindered program officials’ timely decision- making

And while some might disagree with the assertion that the F-35 programmatic delays directly impact our National Security but it also impacts the collective security via our NATO partners, I now refer you to the footnote on page 5… thirteen countries (our Allies - minus Turkey because they decided to use Russian Radar and were summarily kicked out of the program) are directly impacted…

Frankly to say the ALIS component has “not lived up to the program’s expectations..” is the GAO being charitable. The ALIS has consistently proven to be an actual failure that put an enumerated strain on the DOD supply chain but also on the maintenance component of the F-35 - leading to cannibalism of other aircrafts for parts. I had previously research the hell out of this- but that research is gone - conversely some of my past research was archived —I spent a significant amount of time researching and reading this report back in December 2020³ - and sure enough I had actually saved the marked up report on my public drive

Now what?

At some point the DOD needs to either implement ALL of the recommendations or at the minimum re-evaluate the performance of Lockheed Martin’s F-35 contract. While my previous (and overly simplified) analogy of the F-35 program is like a snowball descending down a mountain. It is actually an accurate description because based on the newly released GAO report - the F-35 program is akin to a vast money pit and it’s putting our Military and that of our Allies in danger. Meaning some of the programmatic delays are self inflicted by the DOD and further exasperated by the Prime Contractor - as previously detailed here. The main part is as tax payers we are billions of dollars into this mess and by most casual observations, there really isn’t an end insight and an amicable accord seems to be further out of reach.

Lastly should you be inclined I made sure to source as many previous GAO F-35 reports/audits that I could find. If reading hundreds of pages of various reports isn’t your thing (I’m not judging you) then I would recommend you watch this recently released CNBC F-35 segment

-Filey

1. Previous GAO F-35 Joint Striker Fighter Reports in quasi chronological order;

F-35 Aircraft Sustainment:DOD Needs to Address Substantial Supply Chain Challenges GAO-19-321 | Published: Apr 25, 2019 | https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/698733.pdf

GAO is making eight recommendations, including that DOD determine actions to close the gap between warfighter requirements and F-35 supply chain performance; and address challenges with deployments, global parts movement, and spare parts accountability. DOD concurred with all of GAO's recommendations.

F-35 Aircraft Sustainment:DOD Faces Challenges in Sustaining a Growing Fleet - GAO-20-234T |Published: Nov 13, 2019 | https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-20-234t.pdf

“GAO has 21 recommendations related to the challenges described in this statement that DOD has not fully implemented. DOD generally concurred with all 21 recommendations. Continued attention to these recommendations is needed by DOD to successfully operate and sustain the F-35 fleet over the long term within budgetary realities”

F-35 Joint Strike Fighter:Actions Needed to Address Manufacturing and Modernization Risks - GAO-20-339 Published: May 12, 2020 https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-20-339.pdf

“Congress should consider extending DOD's reporting requirement for Block 4 modernization beyond 2023. GAO is also making five recommendations to DOD. While DOD did not concur with two of these recommendations—including to evaluate production risks and update its Block 4 cost estimate with a program-level plan, it identified actions that, if implemented, will meet the intent of these recommendations. DOD concurred with GAO's three other recommendations”

F-35 Sustainment:DOD Needs to Address Key Uncertainties as It Re-Designs the Aircraft's Logistics System GAO-20-665T Published: Jul 22, 2020 https://www.gao.gov/assets/710/708380.pdf

“…GAO previously recommended that DOD develop a performance-measurement process for ALIS, track how ALIS is affecting F-35 fleet readiness, and develop a strategy for re-designing the F-35's logistics system. GAO also suggested that Congress consider requiring DOD to develop a performance-measurement process for its logistics system. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendations and is taking actions to address them”

2. F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: Development Is Nearly Complete, but Deficiencies Found in Testing Need to Be Resolved, GAO-18-321 (Washington, D.C.: June 5, 2018);

F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: DOD Needs to Complete Developmental Testing Before Making Significant New Investments, GAO-17-351 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 24, 2017);

F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: Continued Oversight Needed as Program Plans to Begin Development of New Capabilities, GAO-16-390 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 14, 2016).

3. NCMAS REPORT - last visited December 2020 -focus on aviation cannibalism of parts… https://www.militaryaviationsafety.gov/newsroom/NCMAS_Final_Report.pdf - again a highlighted and annotated copy of the report can be found on my public drive